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1 Introduction
Literally, the term “crisis” means “crossroads” or
“parting of the ways” in the original Greek and thus
symbolizes a situation, in which something can
develop in different directions (Graeber 2011, 185).
Certainly, the financial and economic crisis is such a
parting of the ways and raises the question, to what
extent the affected citizens try to become “familiar
with the place” in order to be able to contribute to a
decision on the direction.
In an Europe-wide, representative survey by TNS
Infratest (2010), 51 to 87 per cent of the interviewed
(according to the country) said that during
schooldays, periods of vocational training or years
of study they had learned little or nothing about
economics and finances. Traditionally, Europeans
and especially the Germans neither inform them-
selves sufficiently in a private context (e.g.
conversation amongst relatives and friends) nor with
respect to so-called “public knowledge” (generated
from economics literature or relevant newspapers/
magazines) about financial matters. With regard to
the previous year of crises only eleven per cent of
the interviewed Germans (ibid.) said they informed
themselves actively, e.g. by reading the financial
section of a newspaper. Has the financial and
economic crisis changed anything? The media-
producing institutions report massively about the
financial and economic crisis. Even in 2012 the
media covered the financial crisis of 2007-2008 as
well as the “European Debt Crisis” on an almost daily
basis. However, considering the media-consuming
citizens the feedback was not much to look at. An
analysis of news queries on the internet (Google
Zeitgeist 2008-2011) does not show a top-ranking
for any crisis-related keyword in Europe. And also
the above-mentioned research study on financial
matters shows that since the beginning of the crisis
only about six per cent of the Germans increased
their activities to educate themselves further in the
field of financial matters, but just as many also
decreased their activities. One reason for the
reluctance to inquire about the financial crisis could
be the crisis semantics itself with a broad variety of
incomprehensible acronyms (CDO, ESM, EFSM etc.)
and an inconsiderate repetition of veiling
euphemisms respectively dysphemisms (e.g. bailouts
and financial umbrellas respectively bad banks or
toxic stocks). However, it is noteworthy that accor-
ding to the study especially persons, who already
acquired considerable knowledge about economics
and finances while going to school, are also much
more eager for knowledge with regard to the crisis.
If socio-economic education is supposed to enable
students to orient themselves in socio-economic
processes and to play an active role in the shaping
of the socio-economic system, an up-to-date and
explosive topic such as the financial crisis should
not be neglected. The present contribution meets
this challenge. The claim is not just to deal with the
financial crisis in a descriptive way or to exhibit
pseudo-controversies about market-optimistic versus
market-pessimistic positions. From the authors’
point of view the educational potential is not even
utilized totally, if the financial crisis is only used as
an opportunity to deal with the common socio-
economic categories. Therefore, in this article, the
educational discussion comes after a thorough
analysis of the topic (of the financial crisis and
possible paths of development). Later on, it is
debated, how learning in and from the crisis can be
modeled and what kind of implications it has for
socio-economic education.
Does after the crisis mean before the crisis? Financial crises are part of the economic cycle and therefore not
only absolutely normal but under certain circumstances beneficial. Is this also true for the ongoing financial
crisis? It might be too soon to draw final conclusions, but financial crises show a great potential to encourage
learning from the past and to foster socio-economic education. That’s not meant as a belittlement of the
financial crisis, but should sharpen the mind to notice a primary dilemma of our economic system: Even though
increasing credit facilities contributed to the economic prosperity during the last decades, the development of
savings and debts should be in balance with the long-term productive capacity of society, economy and
environment. The authors will review certain aspects and causes of the financial crisis under social und
environmental constraints and will discuss possible long-term paths of development from an economic
perspective. Following this, didactical implications will be considered and feasible learning content will be
discussed.
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2 Economic analysis of the financial crisis
2.1Historical classification
Without doubt, the financial crisis, whose effects
have been keeping us on tenterhooks for nearly five
years, marks a serious break in global economic
development. For the first time since the survey of
the data, global economic performance decreased
on an annual basis: According to the World Bank the
real gross domestic product 2009 decreased by
2.3%. Almost all economically advanced nations
registered massive market downturns. Only the big,
emerging markets could still register a positive
economic development for the whole period
between 2007 and 2010, although on a lower level.
Illustration 1 classifies the economic development
of the last four decades for the biggest national
economy in Europe. Illustrated is the development of
the German real gross domestic product in the
period between 1970 to 2011 – index-based (right
scale) and in annual growth rates (left scale).
If you consider the economic development of
Germany in the last four decades, the enormous
increase of economic performance is apparent.
When you set real GDP of 1970 as 100, it is more
than 240 today. This comes up to an average,
annual growth rate of 2%. The latest financial crisis
does not change this image substantially. Without
the heavy economic collapse 2009 the real economic
performance of Germany today would only be 10,5
billion Euro (0,4%) higher than officially stated
(implying a proxy of the average annual growth
between 1970 and 2008 of 2,2 % also for 2009).
Like every developed economy also the German
was confronted with several crises in the past.
Market downturns and recessions are a natural
well as the “European Debt Crisis” on an almost daily
basis. However, considering the media-consuming
citizens the feedback was not much to look at. An
analysis of news queries on the internet (Google
Zeitgeist 2008-2011) does not show a top-ranking
for any crisis-related keyword in Europe. And also
the above-mentioned research study on financial
matters shows that since the beginning of the crisis
only about six per cent of the Germans increased
their activities to educate themselves further in the
field of financial matters, but just as many also
decreased their activities. One reason for the
reluctance to inquire about the financial crisis could
be the crisis semantics itself with a broad variety of
incomprehensible acronyms (CDO, ESM, EFSM etc.)
and an inconsiderate repetition of veiling
euphemisms respectively dysphemisms (e.g. bailouts
and financial umbrellas respectively bad banks or
toxic stocks). However, it is noteworthy that accor-
ding to the study especially persons, who already
acquired considerable knowledge about economics
and finances while going to school, are also much
more eager for knowledge with regard to the crisis.
If socio-economic education is supposed to enable
students to orient themselves in socio-economic
processes and to play an active role in the shaping
of the socio-economic system, an up-to-date and
explosive topic such as the financial crisis should
not be neglected. The present contribution meets
this challenge. The claim is not just to deal with the
financial crisis in a descriptive way or to exhibit
pseudo-controversies about market-optimistic versus
market-pessimistic positions. From the authors’
point of view the educational potential is not even
utilized totally, if the financial crisis is only used as
an opportunity to deal with the common socio-
economic categories. Therefore, in this article, the
educational discussion comes after a thorough
analysis of the topic (of the financial crisis and
possible paths of development). Later on, it is
debated, how learning in and from the crisis can be
modeled and what kind of implications it has for
socio-economic education.
Illustration 1: Development of real GDP in Germany 1970-2012 (sources: Bundesbank, own calculations)
element of the economic processes and originate
from the compensating interaction between supply
and demand. To some extent, as in 2001 after the
bursting of the DotCom-Bubble or also in the current
crisis, previously built up exaggerations are reduced
to a more realistic degree. Also if they partly have
painful “side effects”, e.g. in the form of unemploy-
ment or loss of property and income, crises also
create the potential for further development. Even
though it will be remembered as a comparatively
serious recession - also in the long run, the financial
crisis of 2008/ 2009 joins a long list of economic
crises. Within the last 40 years Germany underwent
eight technical recessions (at least half in series with
negative growth).
The comparative look at the recent past can
modify our view of the current crisis to some extent.
However, the reasons for the problems should in no
way be trivialized. Quite the contrary: A more
profound understanding of the connections and
reasons for the crisis can contribute to changes so
that the extent of future economic crises will be
smaller. An important reason, especially with regard
to the severity of global, economic market break-
downs can be seen in the long lasting growth of
economic imbalances.
2.2 Economic imbalances as central reason of the
crisis
The global economic development of the last
decade is, among other things, characterized by
increasing imbalances (e.g. Obstfeld & Rogoff 2009).
On the one hand there are national economies that
realize enormous saving surpluses, or in other words
they built up a significant amount of claims – first
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and foremost the export nations China, Japan and
Germany. On the other hand there are countries
which accumulate huge mountains of debt; here, the
USA stands out notably.
A consideration of the globally aggregated level
furthermore shows that the economic development
in the form of global GDP could not keep up with the
worldwide dynamics of indebtedness or savings. So
the global value-added (nominal GDP) increased by
about 80% within the last 10 years. In the same
period of time the worldwide total indebtedness rose
by 160%.
Illustration 2 shows an estimation of the global total
indebtedness (private and governmental) on the
basis of a random sample of altogether 79 countries.
As the methodology of the survey is difficult to
reconstruct, the illustration only has an indicative
character. But on a global level there is currently a
lack of comparable information from other sources.
The central basis of findings to understand the
financial and economic crisis is the following:
element of the economic processes and originate
from the compensating interaction between supply
and demand. To some extent, as in 2001 after the
bursting of the DotCom-Bubble or also in the current
crisis, previously built up exaggerations are reduced
to a more realistic degree. Also if they partly have
painful “side effects”, e.g. in the form of unemploy-
ment or loss of property and income, crises also
create the potential for further development. Even
though it will be remembered as a comparatively
serious recession - also in the long run, the financial
crisis of 2008/ 2009 joins a long list of economic
crises. Within the last 40 years Germany underwent
eight technical recessions (at least half in series with
negative growth).
The comparative look at the recent past can
modify our view of the current crisis to some extent.
However, the reasons for the problems should in no
way be trivialized. Quite the contrary: A more
profound understanding of the connections and
reasons for the crisis can contribute to changes so
that the extent of future economic crises will be
smaller. An important reason, especially with regard
to the severity of global, economic market break-
downs can be seen in the long lasting growth of
economic imbalances.
2.2 Economic imbalances as central reason of the
crisis
The global economic development of the last
decade is, among other things, characterized by
increasing imbalances (e.g. Obstfeld & Rogoff 2009).
On the one hand there are national economies that
realize enormous saving surpluses, or in other words
they built up a significant amount of claims – first
Illustration 2: Global value-added (nominal GDP) and worldwide indebtedness/ savings 1990-2010
(source: Roxburgh et. al (2011, S. 2), McKinsey (2009, S. 9) IHS Global Insight, own calculations)
Debts and savings are two sides of the same coin.
On an aggregated, global level the savings (or
claims) development always proceeds inversely to
the debt dynamics. Making debts or rather the
debited interest, which results from this, is a form
of redistribution – from the debtor to the creditor.
The debtor promises the creditor to activate his
debts with future value-added.
The possibility to go into debt was a central basic
requirement for our economic advancement in the
last centuries. As a form of redistribution debts
cannot be classified as generally problematic. But if
the building up of debts (promise for value-added) is
bigger than the value-added development in the long
run (debt sustainability), a value-added gap deve-
lops, which theoretically has to be closed sometime
in the future (Eichhorn & Solte 2010, 51).
It is difficult to say when the value-added gap
starts to exceed a “healthy” rate and in the long run
results in economic problems. If the international
dependencies in the form of debts on the one hand
and the savings on the other hand increase
excessively, the sensitivity and responsiveness of
the actors grow. All in all this causes market
fluctuations, which can continue and intensify in a
more or less uncontrollable way. The crises, which
recently occurred, are evidence of this development
(Easterly & Roumeen & Stiglitz 2001).
Causal for the development and extension of the
global value-added gap were and are manifold eco-
nomic imbalances:
•National differences in consumption and savings
combined with different development speeds
between emerging and industrialized coun-
tries partly contributed to huge savings surpluses
or debts (Bernanke 2007).
•To some extent this was enhanced by
misaligned national monetary- and fiscal policies
(e.g. policy of low interest rates in the USA, the
monetary policy of China, the economic policy of
the EU). Each nation following its own interests
has additionally promoted imbalances on a global
scale (Blanchard & Milesi-Ferretti 2010).
•For some economies demographic change
necessitate increased saving (e.g. Germany, China,
Japan), whereas other nations at present do not
(yet) exhibit a comparable necessity to save (e.g.
USA) (Higgins 1998).
•An “innovation” dynamic in the financial sector,
which has been accelerated enormously in the last
30 years, combined with the increasing global
interconnectedness made financial transactions
possible that in the past would not have been
imaginable. Apart from that a strong market opti-
mism in the last decades resulted in an increasing
deregulation especially with regard to capital
markets (Bofinger 2009, 85). Just think about the
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liberalization of the European insurance market
since 1994 or the Interstate Banking and Branching
Effciency Act from 1994 which authorized free
interstate banking within the USA (Favare & Imbs
2010). All in all this process contributed to an
advancing separation between the financial and the
“real” economy (Allen & Snyder 2009, 37), which
for example could be seen in the emergence of a
significant excess liquidity on the money market.
- The pursuit of “more”, which is typical for
humans, is one of our strongest incentives and last
but not least the basis for our economic
development (Smith 1759). But if this is not
inhibited, it also might contribute to exagge-
rations, which subsequently have to be handled in
the form of crises. With regard to the depicted
development of a continually increasing global
value-added gap, there are also contrary
tendencies, which have the poten-tial to attenuate
or rather to reverse it in the future.
- Demographic developments will adjust. Nations
which in the past had a demographically condi-
tioned necessity to save will overage and consume
their savings. In contrast, other nations will start to
accumulate savings surpluses in order to be able
to shoulder demographic burdens in the following
decades.
- Differences in savings and consumption
between countries will presumably shift. In some
of the big emerging markets the consumption
pattern will change with the increasing develop-
ment (Guo & N´Diaye 2010), whereas in some in-
dustrial economies saturation tendencies possibly
repress consumption (Reuter 2010).
- The separation of the finance and the “real”
economy might not continue in an uninhibited
way. Possibly the cycle of “innovation” in the finan-
cial industry, which is closely connected with the
development of information technology, will
subside. In other industries this has already been
experienced in the past (Klepper 1997).
- There is the chance that - in the future - there is
a better alignment of national monetary- and fiscal
policies on a global level and that a sound system
of regulation for international financial markets
will be found and implemented. Nevertheless,
these are just speculations about the future which
may just be wishful thinking.
In so far the current economic model is not
necessarily doomed to failure, as at present can be
read in many places. But in order to guarantee long-
term stability, some adjustments are necessary. If the
system is left to its own resources, economic turbu-
lences in the recently experienced extent will occur
more frequently in the future.
2.3 Potential paths of development
Referring to illustration 2, three different appro-
aches for the future development of the economic
system can be identified. According to the arrange-
ment they can turn out to be more at the expense or
in favor of creditor or debtor:
a) Increasing of the value-added so that it is
brought close to the level of debt.
b) Decreasing of the level of debt so that it is
brought close to the value-added.
c) „Business as usual“.
Five different options for action as possible deve-
lopment paths can be deduced from this.
A1) Real growth (Creditors consume more)
One possibility to align the value-added with the
level of debt, are higher real growth rates. For this
purpose today’s creditors should start saving less or
rather consuming more. In return today’s debtors
would generate higher revenues and could reduce
their debt dynamics. To some extent this process
will start in a self-regulating way in the following
years. As already described, some national
economies with current savings surpluses will
feature savings defi-cits in the future and vice versa.
How creditors, beyond that, can be motivated to
stop saving, remains unsettled.
A2) Nominal growth (Devaluation of savings and
debts)
The value-added gap could also be closed by a
merely nominal growth. Inflation would entail a
reallocation of assets at the expense of creditors.
Partly, previous debts would be devalued. Contrary
to the general opinion, inflation cannot simply be
created. Basically, price increases are always the
result of excess demand. Indeed, public policy and
also the central banks can try to influence the
aggregated demand behavior by means of indirect
stimuli (monetary policy, public relations etc.).
Direct control is not possible. Thus, the “path of
inflation” theoretically is a possibility to close the
value-added gap in parts. However, in practice this is
not an instrument that can be applied in a controlled
way.
B1) Forced saving (Debtors consume less)
Today’s debtors could be „forced“ to reduce their
debts. All else being equal, this would first of all
result in lower consumption. In turn, this would
result in lower real growth rates, unemployment
would increase and social problems would be ampli-
fied. In some approaches exactly this can be ob-
served recently. Whether on the private or the public
level – it is difficult for many debtors to continue
making debts as usual. The consequences of this
„Deleveraging“ can be observed in the USA as well as
in Greece. In the long run, this will also have an
impact on today’s creditors. Thus, it is very likely
that their saving surpluses will be lower than in the
last years.
B2) Debt relief (Creditors agree to waive their
claims)
Debt relief is also associated with distribution
effects – e.g. pension savings might be in danger.
But in contrast to forced savings the creditors bear
some part of the burden. Engaging the creditors
may also cause adverse effects as it could create
negative incentives for investors with possible
contradiction of economy. Nevertheless, comparable
with private-law regulations on insolvency
The possibility to go into debt was a central basic
requirement for our economic advancement in the
last centuries. As a form of redistribution debts
cannot be classified as generally problematic. But if
the building up of debts (promise for value-added) is
bigger than the value-added development in the long
run (debt sustainability), a value-added gap deve-
lops, which theoretically has to be closed sometime
in the future (Eichhorn & Solte 2010, 51).
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liberalization of the European insurance market
since 1994 or the Interstate Banking and Branching
Effciency Act from 1994 which authorized free
interstate banking within the USA (Favare & Imbs
2010). All in all this process contributed to an
advancing separation between the financial and the
“real” economy (Allen & Snyder 2009, 37), which
for example could be seen in the emergence of a
significant excess liquidity on the money market.
- The pursuit of “more”, which is typical for
humans, is one of our strongest incentives and last
but not least the basis for our economic
development (Smith 1759). But if this is not
inhibited, it also might contribute to exagge-
rations, which subsequently have to be handled in
the form of crises. With regard to the depicted
development of a continually increasing global
value-added gap, there are also contrary
tendencies, which have the poten-tial to attenuate
or rather to reverse it in the future.
- Demographic developments will adjust. Nations
which in the past had a demographically condi-
tioned necessity to save will overage and consume
their savings. In contrast, other nations will start to
accumulate savings surpluses in order to be able
to shoulder demographic burdens in the following
decades.
- Differences in savings and consumption
between countries will presumably shift. In some
of the big emerging markets the consumption
pattern will change with the increasing develop-
ment (Guo & N´Diaye 2010), whereas in some in-
dustrial economies saturation tendencies possibly
repress consumption (Reuter 2010).
- The separation of the finance and the “real”
economy might not continue in an uninhibited
way. Possibly the cycle of “innovation” in the finan-
cial industry, which is closely connected with the
development of information technology, will
subside. In other industries this has already been
experienced in the past (Klepper 1997).
- There is the chance that - in the future - there is
a better alignment of national monetary- and fiscal
policies on a global level and that a sound system
of regulation for international financial markets
will be found and implemented. Nevertheless,
these are just speculations about the future which
may just be wishful thinking.
In so far the current economic model is not
necessarily doomed to failure, as at present can be
read in many places. But in order to guarantee long-
term stability, some adjustments are necessary. If the
system is left to its own resources, economic turbu-
lences in the recently experienced extent will occur
more frequently in the future.
2.3 Potential paths of development
Referring to illustration 2, three different appro-
aches for the future development of the economic
system can be identified. According to the arrange-
ment they can turn out to be more at the expense or
in favor of creditor or debtor:
a) Increasing of the value-added so that it is
brought close to the level of debt.
b) Decreasing of the level of debt so that it is
brought close to the value-added.
c) „Business as usual“.
Five different options for action as possible deve-
lopment paths can be deduced from this.
A1) Real growth (Creditors consume more)
One possibility to align the value-added with the
level of debt, are higher real growth rates. For this
purpose today’s creditors should start saving less or
rather consuming more. In return today’s debtors
would generate higher revenues and could reduce
their debt dynamics. To some extent this process
will start in a self-regulating way in the following
years. As already described, some national
economies with current savings surpluses will
feature savings defi-cits in the future and vice versa.
How creditors, beyond that, can be motivated to
stop saving, remains unsettled.
A2) Nominal growth (Devaluation of savings and
debts)
The value-added gap could also be closed by a
merely nominal growth. Inflation would entail a
reallocation of assets at the expense of creditors.
Partly, previous debts would be devalued. Contrary
to the general opinion, inflation cannot simply be
created. Basically, price increases are always the
result of excess demand. Indeed, public policy and
also the central banks can try to influence the
aggregated demand behavior by means of indirect
stimuli (monetary policy, public relations etc.).
Direct control is not possible. Thus, the “path of
inflation” theoretically is a possibility to close the
value-added gap in parts. However, in practice this is
not an instrument that can be applied in a controlled
way.
B1) Forced saving (Debtors consume less)
Today’s debtors could be „forced“ to reduce their
debts. All else being equal, this would first of all
result in lower consumption. In turn, this would
result in lower real growth rates, unemployment
would increase and social problems would be ampli-
fied. In some approaches exactly this can be ob-
served recently. Whether on the private or the public
level – it is difficult for many debtors to continue
making debts as usual. The consequences of this
„Deleveraging“ can be observed in the USA as well as
in Greece. In the long run, this will also have an
impact on today’s creditors. Thus, it is very likely
that their saving surpluses will be lower than in the
last years.
B2) Debt relief (Creditors agree to waive their
claims)
Debt relief is also associated with distribution
effects – e.g. pension savings might be in danger.
But in contrast to forced savings the creditors bear
some part of the burden. Engaging the creditors
may also cause adverse effects as it could create
negative incentives for investors with possible
contradiction of economy. Nevertheless, comparable
with private-law regulations on insolvency
proceedings, a public insolvency law could be
introduced. In an ordered proceeding a debt relief
would be undertaken methodically. Ideally, an ex
ante public insolvency law has got a preventive
character, as it reveals the default risk of public
bonds. With this procedure, the debt dynamics could
be restricted at large. Already for many years the
International Monetary Fund has been discussing an
appropriate mechanism, but even the EU will not
pursue this approach in the short or medium term
(ex post) despite the current debt crisis and the risk
of respective contagion effects (Beck & Wentzel 2010,
74). Thus, an implementation does not seem to be
realistic.
C) „Business as usual“
A scenario for the future which seems to be very
likely for the following years does not envisage
substantial changes in the global economic structure.
Today’s creditors continue saving, today’s debtors
continue incurring debts, the value-added gap
continues to expand. Whereas a closing of the value-
added gap can contribute to a certain stabilization of
the economic development, “business as usual” is the
basis for future extreme crises. In recurring cycles,
overindebted or illiquid market participants become
insolvent and cause problems.
Illustration 3: Relation of annual consumption and annual reproduction of bio-capacity global 1961-2007
(source: Global Footprint Network 2010)
Table 1: Annual reproduction and consumption of bio-capacity in hectare per capita 2007
(source: Global Footprint Network 2010)
2.4 Ecological dimensions: nature and social
freedom
The “choice” between the depicted, characteristic
paths of development already seems to be difficult
enough. To make matters worse, there are envi-
ronmental as well as social preconditions that
increasingly limit the scope of action. It is beyond
dispute that our economic activities are not in line
with a sustainable use of natural resources. To
exemplify this, the concept of the ecological
footprint will be used here. The concept of the
ecological footprint is not without controversy (cf.
e.g. Moffatt 2000), even though so far there is a lack
of clearly superior measurement methods. At this
point the results are only supposed to have an
exemplary character. The concept of the ecological
footprint relates the annual consumption of bio-
capacity (first and foremost the emission of CO2) to
the reproduction of bio-capacity per year (CO2-
absorption). Until the end of the 1970s a surplus of
CO2-absorption could be observed on the global
level (Global Footprint Network 2010). However,
since the 1980s the ratio has inverted. Every year
more bio-capacity is consumed than reproduced – in
a manner of speaking ecological debts are built up
(Becker 1998, 2). The most current date from the
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year 2007 show that every year we consume 1.5
times as much bio-capacity as it is reproduced (cf.
illustration 3), or in other words: Humanity would
need 1.5 earths to be able to carry on their current
economic model permanently (Ketterer & Lippelt
2010).
With regard to the consumption of natural
resources there are considerable regional diffe-
rences (cf. table 1). Again, the ecological footprint is
used to exemplify this. On the one hand the
differences can be accounted for by different geo-
graphical conditions. For example, the exten-
siveness of forest areas, which can absorb high
amounts of CO2, is distributed very differently on a
regional level. On the other hand countries feature
strongly differing economic production processes
and levels. Currently, industrial economies make the
biggest contribution to the ecological debt accumu-
lation. Emerging countries still are behind that.
However, it is very likely that this will change in the
following decades, even if many emerging countries
learn from the experiences of industrial states and
skip some of the ecological developmental stages.
In the future the ecological threshold will also
influence the economic development. In this context
there won’t be “business as usual” (cf. Meadows et
al. 1972). On the one hand a limit for conventional
growth could be deduced from the finiteness of
natural resources (Lutter & Giljum 2009). On the
other hand the side effects of the decade-long
overexploitation of natural resources could weaken
the trend growth (e.g. environmental pollution,
climate change, more frequent and graver natural
catastrophes). For this also compare the discussion
about „Peak Oil“ or rather „Peak Everything“
(Heinberg 2010), the excess of the maximum output
of natural resources.
If you put the above-mentioned development
paths with regard to dealing with the global value-
added gap in an ecological context it becomes
Illustration 4: Gini coefficient of the national distribution of income
(Source: Solt 2009, own calculations)
If you put the above-mentioned development
paths with regard to dealing with the global value-
added gap in an ecological context it becomes
obvious that the growth strategies (real or nominal
growth) as well as “business as usual” are on a
collision course with ecological necessities and thus
cannot be implemented without conflicts. Only the
often-cited, but so far not sufficiently observed,
green growth utopias (“green technologies”, health
care market) raise hope at this point. It remains to
be seen if they will occur to an adequate degree.
In addition to ecological restrictions, which
become more and more important in the future,
also social aspects will co-determine the process of
a consolidation of the value added gap. In this
context the past decades came along with growing
social instabilities, which e.g. can be illustrated with
the help of the development of the income
distribution (cf. illustration 4). The Gini coefficient
for the national income distribution is one of the
most established parameters to illustrate economic
results of distribution, but nevertheless it is not
without criticism (e.g. Atkinson 1970). National gini
coefficients have been increasing steadily for the
last decades with only a few exceptions; i.e. that the
income distribution becomes more and more
unequal (Milanovic 2009 and 2011; Solt 2009). In
general, also the distribution of wealth becomes
increasingly unequal, even though the survey of
wealth is connected with comparatively bigger
methodical difficulties than the calculation of
income (Frick & Grabka 2009). With a view to the
future a further factor might be that the above-
described ecological development in the next
decades will also have a negative impact on social
imbalances (Eboli et al. 2010; Tol et al. 2004). In
this context it can be expected that the adaptability
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of the socially disadvantaged with regard to climate
changes turns out to be less; thus, economic
consequences of the climate change might strike
these population groups hardest.
The discussion about distribution inequalities is
controversial. Some consider this as the crucial
impulse for economic action. However, this does
not apply infinitely. As soon as the unequal
distribution exceeds certain (difficult to identify)
limits, it rather is counterproductive from an
incentive-theoretical point of view and can result in
social problems (Aghion et al. 1999). The national
and global developments with regard to the
distribution of economic outputs in the last decades
lead to doubts with regard to the social and finally
to the economic sustainability. A further divergence
of the social gap constitutes a substantial risk for
the stability of the social- and economic system
(Berg & Ostry 2011). Beyond that financial crisis
itself can contribute to increasing inequality
because they often go along with negative
distribution effects (Bofinger 2012, 23). Scopes for
decision-making with regard to a strategy for
closing the global value-added gap are severely
limited by this. “Business as usual” as well as a
purely nominal growth or simple “deleveraging” will
probably be attended by an intensification of social
differences and thus seem to be problematic. At
least it will not work without accompanying
governmental interventions. The decision- and
coordination processes, which are necessary in this
context, lead one to assume that there will be more
social conflicts in the future. inequality because
they often go along with negative distribution
effects (Bofinger 2012, 23). Scopes for decision-
making with regard to a strategy for closing the
global value-added gap are severely limited by this.
“Business as usual” as well as a purely nominal
growth or simple “deleveraging” will probably be
attended by an intensification of social differences
and thus seem to be problematic. At least it will not
work without accompanying governmental interven-
tions.
2.5 Interim conclusion
Economic crises are a recurring element of our
life. We should look into this subject and try to
detect the reasons. Also the current financial and
economic crisis is only one of numerous economic
crises we have experienced in the last decades –
and certainly it won’t be the last. Causal for the
considerable extent of the current economic uphea-
val are distinct exaggerations before the crisis. This
has resulted in the fact that the efficiency of our
economic system has been strained increasingly.
Indebtedness and savings literally outgrow global
value-added. Thus, the global indebtedness dyna-
mics disconnected from the development of the
debt sustainability in the last decades. In this way a
value-added gap originated and expanded, which
theoretically has to be closed in the future – at
least, if we intend to limit the dimension of
economic crises in the future.
Theoretically, there are different paths of
development, which could be taken concerning this
matter. An increased real economic growth would
decrease the value-added gap as well as inflation, a
modified behavior with regard to saving or making
debts or a debt relinquishment. When “choosing”
one of these alternatives it might be complicating
that ecological and social conditions increasingly
restrict the scopes of action. Without a systematic
and systemic rethinking concerning the economic
architecture and the handling of resources (financial
but also natural and social), which is intended with
this, a faster recurrence of extreme crisis becomes
very likely. There is no easy way out.
3 Educational reflection
The financial crisis is an eclectic phenomenon,
which can be considered from the perspective of
different theoretical disciplines. Activity theoretical
models play a central role in social sciences and
their referring educational approaches. Whereas
sociology considers social action as articulation of
socialized humans (output), which is evoked by
elements of social order (input) (Schäfers 2006),
political science considers in addition to "polity" as
the institutional frame (input) and "politics" as the
processes of politics (actions) also "policies" as the
realm and results (output) of public action (Schmidt
2010). Economics on the other hand analyzes, how
and with which means (actions) individuals with
stable preferences and under marginal conditions
(input) maximize their benefit (output) (Schlösser
2008). All three perspectives can be traced back to
the activity model, which is visualized in illustration
5. The emphasis of socio-scientific similarities
should not mask the fact that on the basis of a
shared activity model different activity theories
developed, which partly are in diametric opposition
to each other with regard to their basic assumptions
(cf. actions in dilemma situations of homo oecono-
micus vs. homo reciprocans). But also within the
disciplines there are not less different basic
assumptions (cf. the assumption of rationality of
behavioral economics vs. neoclassical economics).
But, the different approaches of the three socio-
scientific disciplines add up to a more compre-
hensive picture of the phenomenon scope.
Illustration 5: Activity model of social sciences
Whereas historically the study of crises was of
great importance in economics (e.g. Malthus, Marx,
Keynes), under the neoclassical paradigm and its
renaissance in the 1980s these approaches vani-
shed to a great extent. One of only a few confir-
mative exceptions can been seen in the work of
Minsky (e.g. 1982) or as a clairvoyant Roubini. This
can be explained by the fact that the economic
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of the socially disadvantaged with regard to climate
changes turns out to be less; thus, economic
consequences of the climate change might strike
these population groups hardest.
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limits, it rather is counterproductive from an
incentive-theoretical point of view and can result in
social problems (Aghion et al. 1999). The national
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distribution of economic outputs in the last decades
lead to doubts with regard to the social and finally
to the economic sustainability. A further divergence
of the social gap constitutes a substantial risk for
the stability of the social- and economic system
(Berg & Ostry 2011). Beyond that financial crisis
itself can contribute to increasing inequality
because they often go along with negative
distribution effects (Bofinger 2012, 23). Scopes for
decision-making with regard to a strategy for
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limited by this. “Business as usual” as well as a
purely nominal growth or simple “deleveraging” will
probably be attended by an intensification of social
differences and thus seem to be problematic. At
least it will not work without accompanying
governmental interventions. The decision- and
coordination processes, which are necessary in this
context, lead one to assume that there will be more
social conflicts in the future. inequality because
they often go along with negative distribution
effects (Bofinger 2012, 23). Scopes for decision-
making with regard to a strategy for closing the
global value-added gap are severely limited by this.
“Business as usual” as well as a purely nominal
growth or simple “deleveraging” will probably be
attended by an intensification of social differences
and thus seem to be problematic. At least it will not
work without accompanying governmental interven-
tions.
2.5 Interim conclusion
Economic crises are a recurring element of our
life. We should look into this subject and try to
detect the reasons. Also the current financial and
economic crisis is only one of numerous economic
crises we have experienced in the last decades –
and certainly it won’t be the last. Causal for the
considerable extent of the current economic uphea-
val are distinct exaggerations before the crisis. This
has resulted in the fact that the efficiency of our
economic system has been strained increasingly.
Indebtedness and savings literally outgrow global
value-added. Thus, the global indebtedness dyna-
mics disconnected from the development of the
debt sustainability in the last decades. In this way a
value-added gap originated and expanded, which
theoretically has to be closed in the future – at
least, if we intend to limit the dimension of
economic crises in the future.
basic assumption of stable preferences and the
economic efficiency perspective do not get along
with crisis situations. In contrast to this it is not
totally wrong to claim that sociology is a science of
crisis (Uske et al. 1998). Sociological fields of
research are normally closely connected with the
industrialized society and its crises, as, for example
the crisis of the welfare state, the end of the
lifetime-employed society or the breakdown of
traditional gender relations. Political science also
deals with crisis phenomena intensely (Klenk &
Nullmeier 2010). The crisis is a core phase of
political change and a central object of investi-gation
of political scientific conflict research.
However, it is remarkable that the specific focus
on crises (political science, sociology) or rather the
masking of crises (economics) apparently led to the
fact that the activity model is not differentiated
further with regard to the binary distinction “crisis
mode “yes/ no””. In contrast, this was accomplished
in business research with the approach of
organizational learning by Argyris and Schön (1978).
Beyond business studies this approach has been
rarely dealt with so far in social sciences in general
(cf. Hall 1993) as a confirmative exception) and in its
educational disciplines in particular. Organizational
learning differentiates between three learning levels
with regard to the activity model.
a) First order- or single-loop learning
In case of single-loop learning, actions, which do
not have the desired results, are varied (cf.
illustration 6). Preferences and how they develop on
the basis of framework conditions, as, e.g. norms or
institutions, values or policies are not reflected upon
or changed. Learning on this level increases the
efficiency of actions, but not the action potential.
Illustration 6: Single-loop learning
b) Second order- or double-loop learning
The assumption for double-loop learning is the
awareness that single-loop learning does not suffice
to have the favored result; thus, there is a massive
mental disturbance which can be called crisis. In a
crisis it is necessary to question the preferences and
their preconditions in principle and, where required,
to modify the framework conditions or rather to
expand the action potential (cf. illustration 7).
Learning on this level increases the effectiveness of
actions.
c) Third order- or deutero learning
In the case of deutero learning previous problem-
solving pro-cesses are reflected and analyzed. The
intended purpose is to reach a meta-level by (cf.
illustration 8) elaborating on learning strategies and
Illustration 7: Double-loop learning
by trying to optimize them. Deutero learning
enhances the ability to be able to deal with problems
and to be able to distinguish if first- or second-order
learning is necessary and to develop new or
improved learning strategies to practice crisis
prevention.
Illustration 8: Deutero learning
The analysis of the financial crisis in conside-
ration of environmental and social requirements
shows that a real coping with the crisis cannot work
on the basis of “business as usual” (cf. development
path C) and also a single-loop learning according to
the schema “keep it up, but better” (cf. development
paths A1 or B1) does not seem to be very promising
for a long-term moderation of imbalances.
According to the approach by Argyris and Schön,
crises require a double-loop learning, which includes
framework conditions of action as values and
policies. In addition to the current coping with a
crisis it is advantageous in the sense of deutero
learning, to perform a reflection of social problem
solving procedures.
4 So what? Learning in and from crises
The consideration of the evolutionary approach by
Argyris and Schön (1978) expands the categorical
approaches of educational concepts as from
Kaminski and Eggert (2008) for economic education
as well as from Massing (1994) for civic education.
Kaminski and Eggert (2008) consider action theory
as the basis for an attempt to put economic edu-
cation in a logical order. Massing considers politics
as an endless chain of attempts to cope with social
present-day and future problems (policy cycle).
Whereas in the case of Kaminski and Eggert the
economic efficiency perspective dominates, Massing
puts the legitimacy of political processes into the
center of attention. However, both approaches syste-
matically do not include the differentiation between
first- and second-order learning and to a certain
extent both approaches mask the efficacy dimension
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of economic and political actions. In the following a
proposal is submitted, how the particularities of a
crisis could create an additional benefit for social
science education. In addition to the acquisition of
categorical insights (cf. a-c) learners should be
enabled to realize that crises require double-loop-
and deutero learning (cf. d-g). For this purpose the
following topics are suggested, which can be
integrated into the curricula across disciplines.
Categorical approach (first-order learning):
a) Connection between savings and indebtedness
(economics education)
b) Distribution of income and wealth (civic
education)
c) Growth processes (mathematics)
Reflection and learning to learn from crises
(second-/ third-order-learning):
d) Debts and morale (ethics/ religious education,
German/ English)
e) History of financial crises (economics
education/ history)
f) International measures to reorganize the
financial markets (civic education)
g) Sustainability/ ecological footprint (natural
science education)
On a) Connection between savings and indebtedness
The transmission mechanism, which describes the
coherences and consequences of monetary measures
on the real economy, is fundamental for the
understanding of the financial and economic crisis in
particular and the financial and economic system in
general. In standard economic education the
connection between consumption and saving as well
as saving and investing is dealt with again and again
(e.g. www.oeconomix.de). However, the intercon-
nection of savings and indebtedness is not thema-
tized and likewise no basic understanding occurs.
Furthermore neoclassical economics derives its
models from equilibrium assumptions which can be
observed as inappropriate in times of crisis. Its
assumptions and shortcomings should be elabo-
rated.
On b) Distribution of income and wealth
Huge differences in the distribution of income and
wealth have always been the trigger for revolutions
and upheavals (Graeber 2011). In addition it can be
noticed that bubbles on the financial market often
develop with a growing inequality of the income
distribution (Kindleberger 1989). Higher incomes
feature a higher savings ratio, which, in addition to a
basic financial security, are invested also in a specu-
lative way in shares, real estate or raw materials.
However, lower income strata are normally struck
more existentially by the consequences of bursting
financial bubbles.
On c) Growth processes
In monetary and fiscal policy growth effects play
an important role and again and again result in
misunderstandings. Economist and politicians often
say that we need a growth of at least two per cent
and central banks warn against an increase of the
inflation above two per cent. But why is two per cent
such an important threshold? If the economic
growth in a country is permanently below two per
cent, then it takes 35 to 70 years until wealth has
doubled. This period of time exceeds the horizon of
experience of one generation (“I’m not better off
than my parents”) so that the economic situation is
perceived as stagnancy. In the Dark Ages the growth
rates were even below one per cent permanently and
the conception of economic activity as zero sum
game established (Maddison 2001). In the course of
industrialization the growth rates increased
considerably above two per cent. The time for the
doubling of wealth reduces to 23 to 35 years in case
of growth rates of two to three per cent. Thus, the
wealth dynamics between the generations becomes
perceptible. In the field of inflation, the exponential
growth has a contrary effect. In case of inflation
rates below two per cent, currency devaluation is
hardly observable, whereas in times of galloping
inflations savings, but also debts, are halved in just
a few years.
On d) Debts and morale
In all world religions a strange paradox can be
observed: On the one hand a commercial granting of
credit is objectionable, on the other hand it is an
ethical command to repay borrowed money (cf.
Graeber 2011, 15). The terms money, guilt and
debts are not only closely related etymologically, but
also on a conceptual level. The bible (e.g. Matthew
18, 23-24) and many works of world literature (e.g.
Goethe‘s Faust or Shakespeare’s Merchant of Venice)
take up this topic again and again (e.g. Sedlacek
2012). In order to understand and reflect the
underlying norms concerning economic activities
dealing with savings and debts a liberal arts oriented
approach is necessary. One can observe that the
Matthew (VI: 9-13) version of the paternoster
addresses debt relief as an act of Christian charity
directly: „Give us this day our daily bread, and
forgive us our debts, as we also have forgiven our
debtors.“ That points out that financial crises does
not only have an economic but also a humanistic
dimension.
On e) History of financial crises
By dealing with historical financial crises, as, for
example Tulip mania 1637, Mississippi Bubble/
South Sea Bubble 1719/ 1720, the first global eco-
nomic crisis 1857, the banking panic 1907 or the
second global economic crisis 1929 in comparison
to the financial and economic crisis 2007/ 2008,
learners can investigate the recurring, structural
basic patterns, but also the differences of financial
crises (Kindleberger 1989). It can be shown, which
serious economic, political and social consequences
emanated from crises. In this context, the differing
handling of the first global economic crisis 1857 in
the Northern and Southern states of the USA (Union
and Confederate) did not insignificantly contribute
to the American Civil War and also the second global
economic crisis in the year 1929 promoted the rise
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of fascistic parties in Europe. In the past crises were
the sources for fundamental economic-political
reforms (double-loop learning). In this context the
foundation of the American Central Banks (Federal
Reserve System) in the year 1913 was an answer to
the banking panic 1907, the implementation of the
separate banking system (1933) in the USA was a
reaction to the second global economic crisis and the
particular emphasis of the stability of money in the
German Federal Bank Act was an answer to the
hyperinflation in 1923.
On f) International measures to reorganize the
financial markets
As a reaction to the financial crisis in Asia 1997
the ministers of finance and the central bank gover-
nors of the 20 most important industrialized and
emerging countries (G-20) met in Berlin in the year
1999. Nine years later, the financial and economic
crisis of 2007/2008 was necessary that the G-20,
this time the heads of the governments, met again in
2008. The institution of the G-20 shows that a
double- or even third-order learning has been initi-
ated and makes the policy cycle evident consider-
ably. However, the decisions of the G-20 (Kirton
2008) show how difficult it is to really apply second-
order learning on a global scale. So far, only single-
loop learning can be stated:
- More accurate supervision of rating agencies
- Better control of hedge funds and extension of
the regulation of financial products
- Increased equity capital requirements for
financial institutions
- More transparent information for consumers
- Long-term incentive system for managers
- Fight against tax havens and
- Extension of the International Monetary Fund
(IMF).
Basic changes (as a public insolvency law) are not
identifiable yet.
On g) Sustainability/ ecological footprint
The concept of sustainability comes from forestry
and can be exemplified especially well with the help
of biological systems (cf. Piorkowsky 2001). There is
a tradition of regarding sustainable development as
a challenge to economic education in Germany (cf.
Weber 1999). A basic comprehension of natural
scientific connections with regard to production
processes and the dealing with resources and
emissions is necessary to make the global dimension
of the problem clear and to understand, why double-
loop/ deutero learning is necessary. However, the
core dilemma of “growth” between the strands of
being a prerequisite for prosperity and at the same
time a cause for ecological destruction still remains.
Nevertheless, it has to be addressed in order to
develop a moral sense.
It is a difficult undertaking to deal with the
financial and economic crisis in an adequate way in
terms of education. It needs a profound knowledge
about basic economic and social relationships.
Therefore, an extensive didactical transformation is
necessary. It has to be emphasized that in addition
to categorical approaches the potential of crises is to
“learn learning”. Beyond that, a deep understanding
of the structural problems of our international
economic architecture and especially a detailed
discussion about possible and probable paths of
development can prepare the ground for essential
future changes. Awareness about ecological and
social limitations play an important role in this
context. A broad based internalized understanding of
future economic needs is a necessary requirement in
order to tolerate partly painful changes like debt
relief. It can be critically noted that the discussed
potential paths of development and the featured
educational suggestions follow the aphorism to
source out social problems, which possibly cannot be
solved by the current generation, into the edu-
cational context. The pedagogical hope is that at
least future generations are in the position to
counteract these problems.
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